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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 Previous studies have shown that people use environmental cues to identify the 
intentions of others with whom they interact.  This study sought to examine how an 
observer’s incidental memory for strangers was influenced by the emotional expression 
displayed by the stranger as well as the type of action in which the stranger was involved.  
Incidental memory was assessed using a memory task that first asked observers to view a 
series of faces (“targets”) that were each paired with an action.  Later, observers were 
asked if they recognized previously viewed targets amongst novel targets.  Incidental 
memory tasks are used to investigate whether or not observers (a) recognize where they 
had seen targets that they had been exposed to earlier (a.k.a. source memory) and (b) 
recognize the details that are idiosyncratic to a given target (e.g., facial expression, 
behavior within their environment, etc.).  Overall, as expected in an incidental memory 
task, observers displayed a source memory advantage for novel targets that were not 
originally presented.  Inconsistent with previous research, observers’ memory for the 
targets was not greatly impacted by the nature of the activity that they were involved in 
during the early phase of the experiment (e.g., deed or misdeed).  However, the emotional 
expression displayed by the target did have a substantial influence on the observer’s 
ability to recognize the target.  Specifically, observers recognized targets the best when 
they had been previously seen displaying negative emotions.  In addition, although prior 
iii 
 
research suggests that individuals who perform good deeds are not readily recognized 
relative to those who perform bad deeds, observers were far superior at recognizing 
targets that performed good deeds but that also expressed negative emotions.  The 
inconsistency between the target’s emotional expression and action may have 
strengthened the observer’s representation of the target, suggesting that observers may be 
more sensitive to the actions performed by others if ill-intentions are perceived through 
their emotional displays.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
People themselves are often described as being a “good guy” or a “bad guy” 
depending on their actions and, more importantly, their intentions.  Likewise, research 
has shown that negative experiences affect us more than positive ones (Baumeister et al., 
2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Baumeister and colleagues pointed out that negative 
events have a larger effect psychologically than positive events, if both are equal (for 
example, losing twenty dollars affects you more than finding twenty dollars), possibly 
because humans have evolved to be more attuned to negative outcomes to avoid 
unpleasant experiences in the future.  Baumeister and colleagues believe that animals that 
were more sensitive to negative stimuli were better able to survive and pass on their 
genes.  Baumeister and colleagues also believe that when forming an impression of 
someone, we focus on and give more weight to the negative information about that 
individual.  The hypothesis that “bad is stronger than good” definitely applies to memory.  
Observers remember bad behaviors better than good behaviors when viewing pictures of 
individuals performing these good or bad deeds (Baumeister et al.).  One explanation for 
this outcome is that negative behaviors capture more of an observer’s attention, which 
allows for a stronger memory trace to form, consciously or nonconsciously.  The present 
study investigates how an observer’s incidental memory for a target actor is influenced by 
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the emotion that the actor is expressing as well as by how socially acceptable the actor’s 
behavior is. 
Forming Impressions 
 When interacting with people who perform good deeds or bad deeds, the initial 
behaviors that one observes can leave a lasting first impression that may bias subsequent 
interactions.  Vital to first impressions is the spotlight effect that negative behaviors have 
on one’s assessment of a stranger’s character.  Specifically, Skowronski and Carlston 
(1987) found that people show a negativity bias when forming first impressions.  In other 
words, negative behaviors were found to be more diagnostic (i.e., more relevant) when 
forming first impressions of strangers than were positive behaviors.  Moreover, if the 
negative behavior was more extreme in nature (e.g., it is not at all socially acceptable 
versus justifiable), then that behavior was more likely to be factored into the participant’s 
judgment of the actor.   
In addition to weighting the potential for harm that may result from an actor’s 
behaviors, observers’ first impressions are also greatly influenced by environmental cues 
(such as facial features) that signal the true intentions of the target’s actions.  Ames and 
colleagues (2004) found that participants analyzed the intentions of helpers (or people 
who perform good deeds) based on three factors: the helper's affective state, their role in 
the situation, and the helper’s potential for gain.  Participants were more likely to interact 
with a helper and reciprocate in kind if the helper acted based on a desire to create 
positive affect.  However, they were less likely to interact with the helper if he ran a cost-
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benefit analysis to determine what he may gain from the situation or if the helper acted 
because his role obligated him to do so.  In addition, upon receiving help, people 
generally feel indebted no matter what the intentions of a helper might be, but they only 
feel grateful if the person helped out of benevolence rather than a drive to advance 
themselves (Tsang, 2006).  From a social standpoint, relationships can be facilitated by 
displaying good behaviors towards others, but there is no guarantee that good behavior is 
necessarily memorable behavior.  In fact, prior research suggests that, regardless of how 
one feels about an actor, how memorable that actor’s behavior actually may be is 
dependent upon the extent to which the behavior runs counter to social norms.  
Deeds Versus Misdeeds 
The current study explores the hypothesis that misdeeds label an actor in a way 
(i.e., negativity bias) that makes him (or her) incidentally more memorable when one 
comes into contact with that actor during future interactions.  In incidental memory 
research in which an observer is told to passively observe a target rather than carefully 
study his or her behavior, the exact features of a target’s misdeed (e.g., cheating) are not 
later remembered.  Rather, a more general negative feeling about that person is stored and 
reactivated by the observer (Mehl & Buchner, 2007).  Not surprisingly, one’s emotional 
intuition is more accurate immediately after being exposed to a misbehaving target than if 
examined one week later. This is consistent with a shallow arousal (or surprise) based 
explanation for enhanced recognition in which the impression of a “bad guy” is 
temporarily accessible to the participant so that the target can be generally categorized as 
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someone to avoid.   
 To further examine the depth of memory that people have for those who perform 
misdeeds, Buchner and colleagues conducted a follow-up study that focused on source 
memory (where the participant remembers seeing the target) for cheaters.  The authors 
were interested in determining if the location of a cheater (e.g., initial exposure in the 
study phase of an incidental memory task) would be remembered even if the details of 
the transgression could not be bound to the perpetrator.  For each target, participants 
viewed a photo of a unique neutral facial expression paired with a written description of a 
deed or misdeed (Buchner, Bell, Mehl, & Musch, 2009).  Participants did not show 
enhanced memory for the type of behavior performed by a target (i.e., acceptable or not 
acceptable), but they did, in fact, display better recognition memory for transgressors 
who had been presented in the initial study phase.  Those who had performed good deeds 
were less memorable.  These findings held regardless of the severity of the deed or 
misdeed.  Interestingly, the authors discovered a similar outcome when repeating the 
experiment but pairing deeds and misdeeds with fictitious names rather than neutral facial 
expressions (Bell & Buchner, 2009).   
In sum, these findings support the authors’ earlier research and demonstrate that 
some minimum level of processing was taking place to build a superficial memory trace 
of bad guys found in the participants’ environment.  What is unclear about these findings 
is the type of information that people incorporate into their mental representations of 
transgressors.  It appears that only very limited information (i.e., the location of the 
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individual but not specific features of the individual’s action) is available to people when 
asked to recognize those who have committed bad deeds relative to new targets or those 
who had performed good deeds.  Given the differences that exist in the methods of each 
study (e.g., faces versus names, source memory versus likeability judgments, etc.), the 
similarity in findings is remarkable.  In the current study, we introduced a more salient 
emotional cue (the target’s emotional facial expression) to assist in the feature binding 
process that takes place when evaluating strangers.  A more salient cue should act to 
disambiguate the intentions of each target, and emotional expressions should create an 
additional feature to which the participant can associate the target’s identity and behavior. 
Emotion and Memory 
 In the current study, we examine whether or not salient emotional cues act to 
strengthen the memory traces of strangers who are only briefly introduced to participants 
through an incidental memory task.  Mather (2007) believes that the emotional 
components of a stimulus (especially when arousing) can serve to capture attentional 
resources and drag them away from other non-emotional components.  Consequently, 
memory for non-arousing, non-emotional stimuli and other background information will 
be inhibited.  This emotional enhancement hypothesis is supported by research showing 
that source memory is strengthened for arousing images presented amongst non-arousing, 
neutral pictures (Mather & Nesmith, 2008). The authors, however, also point out that 
potential gains in memory that stem from the emotional features of a stimulus are bound 
to that specific stimulus and do not necessarily interfere with memory for other stimuli. 
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Consistent with this interpretation, participants in eye-witness memory studies 
have been found to use the emotional nature of a stimulus to build an enriched memory 
trace that later facilitates the accurate reconstruction of the stimulus at retrieval.  For 
example, Christianson et al. (1991) showed participants a set of slides that depicted a 
specific event that they would later be asked to describe. Embedded in this set was a 
critical slide that was either non-arousing or which elicited an emotional response from 
the participant (e.g., bike riding sequence in which the emotional slide displayed head 
trauma).  Associated with this critical slide was a key feature that was important to the 
recreation of the event at retrieval.  Participants who viewed the emotionally evocative 
slide were more likely to focus on this critical detail found in both sequences.  This is 
consistent with Mather’s suggestion that an emotional feature of a stimulus may capture 
one’s attention, reducing the effort that is required to bind that feature to a memory trace 
of the stimulus and thus increasing the odds of later remembering the stimulus.  
 Emotion can similarly enhance one’s memory even when the memory component 
of a task is actually incidental and not intentional.  In incidental memory tasks, 
participants are sometimes asked to classify stimuli using shallow or deep levels of 
processing (i.e., thinking about characteristics of the word versus thinking about the 
meaning of the word), but are not specifically told to memorize the stimuli (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972).  Following this classification phase (a.k.a. a study phase or an exposure 
phase), participants complete a surprise recognition test (or test phase) in which they 
indicate whether or not each member of a given stimulus set had appeared in the 
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classification phase.  Recognition memory is typically better for stimuli that were 
classified under deep processing instructions than it is for those that were classified under 
shallow processing instructions. However, if emotional stimuli capture one’s attention, 
then perhaps memory for emotional items presented under shallow processing 
instructions (“write down the vowels in the word”) will be better remembered than non-
emotional items presented under these same conditions. This is exactly what took place 
when participants were asked study emotional and neutral words using shallow, moderate 
(“write down the color that the word brought to mind”), and deep (“write down how 
positive or negative the word is”) processing instructions (Reber, Perrig, Flammer, & 
Walther, 1994).  The emotional flavor of a given stimulus drew attention to the stimulus 
when the participants’ instructions only required a minimal investment of resources.  In 
other words, the features of the stimulus automatically commanded attention above and 
beyond the superficial analysis of the stimulus that the participants performed.   
Positive Versus Negative Emotion 
 In the current study, the effects that positive and negative emotions displayed by 
the stimuli have on memory accuracy were also examined.  Previous research 
demonstrates that negative emotional features of stimuli (e.g., words, scenes, faces, etc.) 
create a stronger memory advantage than do positive features.  There are a few 
explanations offered for this. First, negative emotional stimuli are believed to create more 
vivid memories than positive stimuli by focusing participants’ attention on key details 
(Kensinger, 2007; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007).  This enhanced 
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focus also can act to boost the participants’ metacognitive judgments of their memory 
accuracy as well (however, over confidence can be problematic for eye-witness memory 
accuracy, see Phelps & Sharot, 2008).  Within the brain, negative emotion may cause 
sensory processing centers to become more active (e.g., Adolphs, 2002; Mienaltowski et 
al., 2011), allowing the viewer to take in more of the details of the event and have better 
memory accuracy, whereas positive emotions cause the viewer to only remember the 
general concept of the event and not the details (Kensinger, 2009).   
 In their seminal review article on the attentional and memorial advantage 
conferred to negative stimuli, Rozin and Royzman (2001) propose that a negativity bias 
often emerges in psychology for four reasons.  First, there is negative potency, or, more 
simply stated, negativity potentiates processing.  If you have two equal entities, a 
negative one will influence an individual more than a positive one.  Second, negative 
emotional experiences become increasingly more negative as their impending doom 
looms nearer.  Timing can matter because, as a negative event draws near, an individual 
may have to activate a defensive response in order to maintain a stable sense of well-
being.  Third, negativity dominates our simultaneous experiences of positive and negative 
emotions.  Finally, negative emotions are more complex and differentiated; negative 
emotions promote deeper thought and often necessitate more cognitive effort to 
ameliorate than positive emotions (e.g., surprise, glee). 
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Predictions 
 For the current study, we wanted to replicate and extend prior incidental memory 
research examining participants’ source memory for target actors who performed good 
deeds or bad deeds by systematically varying the emotional expressions of the target 
actors.  Participants viewed photos of multiple actors, each of which portrayed positive, 
negative, or neutral expressions and were paired with a unique deed or misdeed. 
Consistent with prior research, we expected to find better source memory for actors who 
committed misdeeds than for those who committed good deeds (e.g., Buchner et al., 
2009).  Given the negativity bias noted in previous memory studies (Baumeister et al., 
2001; Christianson et al., 2001; Mather, 2007; Mather & Nesmith, 2008; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001; Skrowronski & Carlston, 1987), target actors who expressed negative 
emotion were also expected to be better remembered than targets expressing positive 
emotions. This prediction was examined both in terms of (a) the participants’ source 
memory as well as (b) the participants’ memory for the acceptable and unacceptable 
nature of an actor’s action if the actor was accurately recognized from his or her initial 
appearance in the study phase of the incidental memory task. 
Furthermore, we know that when forming a first impression, people use 
environmental cues (e.g., behaviors, emotions, and/or the combination of both) to 
determine the intentions of a helper or new acquaintance.  If we perceive the intentions as 
being negative, we should be able to notice and remember that information for future 
interactions.  Moreover, the behavior/emotion combinations implemented in the current 
 10 
 
study are a novel addition to this field.  From them, negative intentions can be examined 
from a more nuanced perspective.  Specifically, aside from interpreting the negativity 
from negative facial expressions and misdeeds, observers may also be sensitive to 
inconsistencies emerging from the individual target’s emotional expression and action.  
For instance, if the target is performing a good deed but expressing anger, an observer 
should recognize the target’s insincerity.  In fact, such insincerity may boost the 
observer’s memory for the target even though, in past research, targets performing good 
deeds were not remembered to the same degree as targets performing misdeeds.  Also, if 
the target is performing a misdeed but expressing happiness, the observer should 
recognize the target’s depravity.  Again, if the observer recognizes the inconsistency in 
the target’s expression and action, the additional effort invested in considering the 
inconsistency should enhance his or her memory for the target.  As suggested by previous 
incidental memory research, memory performance should be best under those conditions 
where a participant spontaneously directs attention to a given face and action pairing to 
bind the details in their memory because this pair is particularly interesting (or attention 
grabbing).   
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Participants 
 The sample used in the current experiment consisted of 25 college students (13 
women, 12 men) aged 18 to 21 from diverse racial backgrounds (76% Caucasian, 8% 
African American, 4% Asian American, and 12% mixed heritage).  All of the participants 
were students at Western Kentucky University, and each received course credit for their 
participation.  Informed consent was obtained from each participant before the 
experiment began (WKU Human Subjects Review: HS10-217).  The participants’ visual 
acuity scores ranged from 20/20 to 20/50, indicating that the participants had adequate 
acuity to detect those facial features relevant to emotion recognition.   
Incidental Memory Task 
 Phase One (Study Phase).  Participants were presented with 48 trials where they 
would view a face of a target actor that was expressing either a positive (happy), neutral, 
or negative (angry) expression.  Under the picture of the actor’s face, there was a caption 
that described an action.  The action would either be a good deed (“deed”) such as “S.G. 
bought someone lunch who didn't have money” or a bad deed (“misdeed”) such as “G.H. 
plagiarized on a paper for class.”  Deeds and misdeeds were developed and normed in 
conjunction with an honors augmentation project to (a) ensure the implementation of 
actions with a wide range of positive and negative impact, and (b) ensure that the actions 
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were actually activities that the participants were familiar with from their own 
experiences.  The participant was asked to answer a number of questions about each 
photo and caption pairing.  First, participants identified which emotional expression 
(positive, negative, or neutral) was displayed by the actor.  This ensured that the 
participant examined the actor’s facial expression.  Participants were also asked to rate 
how socially acceptable the action was on a scale of 1 (Completely Unacceptable) to 7 
(Completely Acceptable), ensuring that the participant considered the target's action.  
Lastly, the participant was asked to rate how likeable that person was on a scale of 1 (Not 
at all likeable) to 4 (Extremely likeable).  Out of the 48 trials, there were 16 neutral, 16 
positive, and 16 negative targets.  Each emotion had an equivalent number of male and 
female faces (8 of each), as well as an equal number of Caucasian and African American 
faces (8 of each).  All photos were adapted from the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of 
Emotion (Beaupré & Hess, 2005), from the NimStim MacArthur Foundation stimulus set 
(Tottenham et al., 2009), and from Google Image searches (all photos were open-access). 
The pictures were presented in grayscale using E-Prime stimulus presentation software 
and possessed a resolution of 500 x 500 pixels. 
 Phase Two (Test Phase).  After completing the first phase of the experiment, 
participants completed approximately 11 minutes of filler tasks (tests of verbal ability and 
inductive reasoning, or the ETS Vocabulary Test and Letter Sets Test, respectively; 
Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976) before moving into the second phase of the 
incidental memory task.  In this phase, the participants' memory for the faces in Phase 
One was measured via a source memory task.  Participants viewed 96 faces, half of 
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which were new to the experiment and half of which were taken from Phase One (old).  
For each face, participants were asked if they recognized the person.  If they did not 
recognize the face, they responded “new” and that trial would end and another face 
would be presented.  However, if the participant did recognize the face, then they 
responded “old” and rated how socially acceptable that person's action from the first 
phase was. Afterwards, the participant was prompted to recall the exact action and type it 
into a response window that popped up on the computer display.  If the participant could 
not remember the action, they were prompted to type “IDK” (initialism for “I don't 
know”) in the box.  There were a total of 96 trials that included 48 new faces (16 each of 
positive, neutral, and negative faces, distributed evenly across race and gender) and the 
48 photos from the first phase.  In addition to analyzing the participants’ memory for the 
source of each actor (old – Phase 1; new – Phase 2), we also focused on those trials 
where the participants correctly identified an old face (one from Phase 1) as “old.” This 
allows us to determine if memory for non-source characteristics (the action for each 
target) is better given the emotional expressions found on the actors’ face.   
Procedure 
 Participants provided informed consent before completing Phase One of the 
incidental memory task.  After Phase One, participants completed filler tasks before 
proceeding on to Phase Two of the incidental memory task.  At the end of the session, 
participants completed a demographics questionnaire and a test of visual acuity.  Overall, 
the session lasted approximately 60 minutes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 This study used a 3 (target’s facial expression of emotion: positive, negative, 
neutral) by 2 (action: deed, misdeed) by 2 (source: old/Phase One, new/Phase Two) 
within-subjects design.  An initial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
examine the impact that emotion had on the source memory of the targets.  Subsequent 
ANOVAS were performed to examine the influence that each target's behavior and facial 
expression of emotion had on the number of correctly recognized items from Phase One 
for each within-subject condition.   
 As mentioned in the method section above, participants viewed 48 targets, 
representing 48 emotion/action pairings, in the study phase (Phase One) of the incidental 
memory task.  Of these, 24 involved targets performing deeds and 24 involved targets 
performing misdeeds.  Each of these sets of 24 trials can be further divided using the 
emotions expressed by the target.  Specifically, there were 8 trials for each emotion 
within each action type.  This means that, when examining the influence of emotion and 
action type on memory accuracy, the range of possible accurate responses can range from 
0 to 8 (emotion by action) or 16 (emotion alone) or 24 (action alone). In the test phase, in 
addition to viewing the same 48 targets presented in the study phase (“old”), participants 
viewed 48 new targets. Of these, 16 expressed positive emotions, 16 expressive negative, 
and 16 displayed no emotion (i.e., neutral). 
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Source Memory from Incidental Memory Task  
Recognizing targets in the test phase.  A 2 (source: old, new) by 3 (emotion: 
positive, negative, neutral) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on the participants’ 
frequency of accurate responses in the test phase of the incidental memory task.  It 
revealed a main effect of source, F(1, 24) = 1088.1 (p < .001, ηp
2
 = .79) and emotion, 
F(2,48) = 19.7 (p < .001, ηp
2
 = .27).  These main effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction between source and emotion, F(2,48) = 17.8 (p = .002, ηp
2
 = .24).  In the test 
phase, participants correctly identified more items only viewed in the test phase as being 
new (M = 14.8, SE = 0.3) than items that they correctly identified from the study phase as 
being old (M = 9.4, SE = 0.6).  Please note that a participant would have a perfect score if 
they correctly identified 16 faces as being new and 16 faces as being old.  Participants 
also displayed more accurate source recognition for targets displaying negative emotion 
(M = 12.8, SE = 0.4) than targets displaying positive emotion (M = 11.6, SE = 0.4) or no 
emotion (M = 11.8, SE = 0.4).  The interaction emerged because participants’ accurate 
classification of targets viewed only in the test phase was not impacted by the targets’ 
emotional expressions (Mpositive = 14.8, SEpositive = 0.3; Mnegative = 14.8, SEnegative = 0.3; 
Mneutral = 14.7, SEneutral = 0.3), but participants were more accurate at recognizing targets 
from the study phase when those targets were expressing negative emotions (Mpositive = 
8.4, SEpositive = 0.6; Mnegative = 10.8, SEnegative = 0.7; Mneutral = 8.9, SEneutral = 0.7).  
Emotion and action type influence the source memory of targets viewed in the 
study phase.  A 3 (emotion: positive, negative, neutral) by 2 (action: deed, misdeed) 
within-subjects ANOVA was performed on the number of items that participants correctly 
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identified as having first appeared in the study phase (i.e., “old” is correct response and 
“new” is incorrect response).  This analysis revealed a main effect of emotion, F(2,48) = 
10.0 (p < .001, ηp
2
 = .29).  Participants were more accurate at recognizing the targets in 
the test phase when the targets had expressed negative emotions in the study phase, 
relative to expressing positive emotion or no emotion.  Please note that a perfect score 
would be 8 correctly identified targets per category.  The means and standard errors for 
each condition are depicted in Figure 1, separately by action type and emotion.  Although 
no significant main effect of action emerged, F(1,24) = 2.3 (p = .15, ηp
2
 = .09), the mean 
difference suggested that there was a trend accounting for a meaningful amount of 
variance such that misdeeds (M = 4.9, SE = 0.3) were more accurately recognized than 
deeds (M = 4.5, SE = 0.3).  There was no significant interaction between emotion and 
action, F(2,48) = 0.5, n.s. 
 Emotion influences recognition of targets over and above the impact of action 
type.  To get a better sense for the impact that emotion had on the participants’ 
recognition accuracy, we examined the participants’ responses in order to isolate only 
those where (a) the participant correctly identified a target as having appeared in the 
study phase (i.e., “old”) and (b) the participant correctly identified the target as having 
performed a socially acceptable (deed) or unacceptable (misdeed) action in the study 
phase.  A 2 (action: deed, misdeed) by 3 (emotion: positive, negative, neutral) ANOVA 
was run on the resulting frequencies.  The analysis revealed that there was a main effect 
of emotion, F(2,48) = 10.9 (p = .019, ηp
2
 = .31) and a rather marginal main effect of 
action type, F(1,24) = 2.6 (p < .12, ηp
2
 = .10).  The means and standard errors for each 
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condition are depicted in Figure 2, separately by action type and emotion.  Overall, 
participants displayed better memory for targets expressing negative emotion than those 
expressing positive or no emotion.  Also, there was a trend for participants to remember 
targets who committed misdeeds better than those who committed deeds.  However, this 
trend did not reach significance. 
Summary 
 During the test phase, participants displayed better recognition for the source of 
novel targets (“new”) than they did for the source of those that were previously seen 
(“old”).  Moreover, “old” negative targets were recognized better than were “old” 
positive targets or “old” targets that displayed no emotion.  Although there was not 
enough power to detect significant differences in participant recognition based on action 
type, there was a trend for participants to display better source memory for targets 
performing misdeeds than for those performing deeds.  Across multiple levels of analysis, 
however, memory for targets was generally better when the targets expressed negative 
emotion than when they expressed positive emotion or no emotion at all.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION 
 This study was conducted to investigate how incidental memory for target 
strangers was influenced by the emotion expressed by these individuals as well as by the 
actions that they have purportedly performed in their community.  Incidental memory is 
particularly important in this study because people use it in day to day activities if they 
run across something in their environment that at first seems inconsequential but then 
later becomes the focus of memory retrieval.  As expected in an incidental memory task, 
participants were able to classify faces unique to the test phase (or novel targets) as being 
“new” better than they were able to classify “old” faces correctly.  Unexpectedly, in the 
conditions where targets were correctly identified as “old,” the deed or misdeed that 
targets committed had no significant effect on memory accuracy.  There was, however, a 
trend to suggest that the source of targets committing misdeeds would be better 
remembered than the source of those performing good deeds.  Although this finding is 
underpowered, it does support prior research examining source memory for transgressors 
(Buchner et al., 2009).  Conversely, it also supports findings from eye-witness memory 
research that suggests that the level of detail that people incidentally remember from 
events is low (Roediger & McDermott, 2000).  Our findings also extend past research by 
demonstrating that negative expressions generally had a greater impact on source 
memory than did positive or neutral expressions did, and memory accuracy for “old” 
faces correctly identified as “old” faces was aided by the target’s negative expressions.   
The findings from the current study partly suggest that the type of action 
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performed by the target can impact memory accuracy in a way that goes beyond source 
memory.  Specifically, it appears that participants focused more on the emotions being 
expressed by the target if they were negative, regardless of whether the negative target 
was performing a good deed or a misdeed, and thus were better able to remember 
negative faces.  This is inconsistent with prior research that merely found a source 
memory effect.  On the other hand, it does suggest that the participants in the current 
experiment formed a deeper representation of the targets that included the emotions that 
they were expressing.  A possible explanation for this is that negative emotional 
expressions captured the participants’ attention and facilitated the allotment of processing 
resources to the negative targets.  We had predicted that this would also likely occur in 
cases where the action and emotion were inconsistent.  Interestingly, our predictions were 
only partly supported in that recognition accuracy was better when the target was 
displaying an insincere emotion/action combination (i.e., displaying a negative 
expression while engaged in a good deed) relative to neutral targets performing deeds or 
misdeeds.  However, we did not find the expected boost to recognition memory when the 
target’s emotion/action combination reflected depravity (i.e., expressing positive emotion 
while committing a misdeed).   
This participant-centered account is consistent with the interpretation that the 
participants considered targets who expressed negative emotions to be “trouble makers” 
and possibly experienced increased arousal.  More importantly, these findings suggest 
that Buchner and colleagues overlooked a powerful factor (emotion) that may be as 
predictive (if not more so) of a person’s memory for a “bad guy.”  As reviewed in the 
 20 
introduction, emotion builds additional context that participants can use to bind the faces 
and actions more efficiently in their memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  Future research 
should examine the extent to which emotion expressed by the target either (a) lowers the 
threshold for information processing by attracting attention to the target/caption pairing 
or (b) creates arousal that focuses the participants attention on the key details of the 
stimuli in this incidental memory task.  These are two competing accounts for the 
interface between emotion and cognition.   
Aside from this novel outcome, it is important to recognize that participants were 
able to correctly characterize targets in the test phase as having performed good deeds or 
bad deeds.  Specifically, this was highlighted in the results section above when reporting 
on how well participants were able to recognize a face in Phase Two and identify what 
kind of action the target committed in Phase One.  In Phase Two, participants were able 
to identify the type of action well, even though many of the actions and emotions were 
inconsistent.  This means that the participants were identifying the action based on their 
memory of the target in Phase One and not on the emotion being expressed by the target.  
Past research has found an increase of memory accuracy for source memory based on 
action, but no studies have found an increase in memory of the action itself prior to the 
current study.  Although our findings are not definitive, with a larger sample, there would 
be enough power to detect differences in memory for targets performing deeds and 
misdeeds.  Future studies should examine the exact details that participants do re-create 
when judging the targets at test.  A better understanding of the contents of the observers’ 
representations of the targets may help legal councils to establish procedures for 
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improving the veracity of eye-witness testimony. 
It is also worth mentioning that, when participants believed that a novel target that 
was only presented in the test phase was also presented earlier in the experimental 
session, they falsely recalled the target as having performed a misdeed (i.e., represents 
16% of all of the trials involving novel distractor targets in Phase Two).  In fact, all 
incorrect identifications of a target presented only in Phase Two as being “old” involved 
the participant believing that the target had performed a misdeed (no matter what 
expression the target was expressing).  This speaks to how sensitive humans are to 
misdeeds in their environment.  Given the aforementioned findings and the low 
recognition of targets that performed good deeds, it is reasonable to assume that the 
current sample was much more focused on the targets’ potential for displaying negativity 
and being engaged in misdeeds. 
 What this study adds to the existing body of literature is evidence to support the 
notion that negative emotion is a strong cue for remembering a target.  Negative emotion 
aids memory in all cases, possibly allowing features of the target to be bound better than 
those for targets who express positive or neutral emotions.  Emotion also matters more 
than other aspects of the target.  One explanation for this is the evolutionary advantages 
created by being able to accurately identify and recall negative stimuli.  For an animal to 
survive long enough to pass on its genes, it has to be able to identify and avoid negative 
stimuli (Baumeister et al., 2001).  Emotion is closely tied to the “old” brain, including the 
Limbic system, which once made up the entire brain of our ancestors prior to the 
emergence of the neocortex.  As the human brain has evolved, it is possible that we built 
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upon the emotion center to allow us to judge the intentions of other people.  This would 
also explain why positive emotion and good deeds matter less, as we do not need to pay 
as much attention to someone who is there to willingly help us and/or someone whom we 
trust. 
 The present study is not without its limitations.  One limitation of this study is that 
the memory for target actions was very low.  This might be explained by the fact that the 
participants were not explicitly told to memorize the actions.  Effects of race and gender 
of the targets were not analyzed.  Such analyses will have to be performed in the future to 
determine if the participants display biases in the way that they remember the targets 
(e.g., poorer recognition of individuals from a different race or better recognition of 
individuals who are of the opposite sex or rated as being more attractive).   Also, with a 
larger sample size, we would have more power to detect the possible impact that target 
action type has on participant recognition of the targets.  Another limitation is that all of 
the photographs were presented in grayscale rather than in color.  This can be problematic 
given that some emotional cues are derived by looking for signs of reddening the eyes 
and cheeks.  A final limitation is that the emotions were all static and not dynamic. 
Conclusions 
 It has been said that actions speak louder than words, or in this case, conveyed 
emotion, but this study does not support that idiom.  We do base some of our judgments 
of people on their overt actions, but, once we have information to form an impression of a 
person, often times we simply base our judgments on emotion.  When we do use actions 
as a basis, however, misdeeds are more often remembered than deeds.  This might be 
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caused by the deeper processing that is required to judge people by their actions (e.g., 
integrating several behaviors with the intentions for their behaviors and the target’s role 
in the situation, etc.) and so we rely on easily available emotional cues (e.g., frowns and 
angry scowls) to make our judgments. 
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Figure 1 
Figure 1. Source Accuracy by Action Type and Emotion Expression  
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Figure 2 
Source Accuracy by Action Type and Emotion Expression for Targets Correctly Identified 
as "Old" and as Acceptable/Unacceptable  
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Appendix A 
List of Deeds 
A.Y. mowed the yard for a neighbor who couldn't do it themselves. 
T.G. helped and supported a friend who overcame a drug addiction. 
G.B. took care of a hospitalized friend's pet dog. 
E.W. gave someone spare change for laundry. 
W.J. volunteered for an inner city outreach organization. 
W.F. read a story to a sick child in a hospital. 
J.V. helped a friend move their belongings to college. 
D.G. comforted someone who was stressed. 
S.G. bought someone lunch who didn't have money. 
M.J. babysat so a married couple could go on a date. 
M.T. dove into a pool to save a child who was drowning. 
K.M. bought food for a friend who couldn't afford to shop. 
H.D. donated old clothing to a charity. 
D.Y. let someone use their phone in an emergency. 
T.I. gave a lost person directions and showed them where to go. 
D.W. drove a friend to the store on a rainy day. 
I.D. sent cards to our armed service men and women at Christmastime. 
Q.I. helped someone change a flat tire. 
Q.D. rescued a dog from the animal shelter before it was put down. 
L.A. helped a friend with a paper they had trouble with. 
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M.D. returned a lost wallet without taking any money. 
L.E. carried groceries to a car for an elderly person. 
J.Y. gave helpful advice to someone with a problem. 
F.H. helped someone with their algebra homework. 
 
 31 
Appendix B 
List of Misdeeds 
W.F. broke something that belonged to someone else and denied it. 
Y.B. ran over their neighbor's dog and didn't stop. 
F.G. cheated on their significant other. 
J.H. murdered their parents with a hatchet. 
K.U. used someone's phone to call long distance without telling them. 
E.F. cut in front of people in line at the grocery store. 
J.J. physically forced themselves on someone at the end of a date. 
V.F. blackmailed someone with very personal information. 
A.D. made a mean comment about someone with a disability. 
W.I. lied on taxes about donating to charity. 
D.A. didn't leave a tip for a good waiter. 
R.G. knowingly smoked in a non-smoking area. 
G.H. plagiarized on a paper for class. 
S.D.  loudly used their phone during a movie in a theater. 
F.K. talked about their inheritance at a funeral. 
G.U. stole a car from a parking lot. 
F.W. left a friend at a party without transportation. 
W.K. stole a puppy they wanted from a neighbor on their street. 
P.T. left after hitting someone else's car in the parking lot. 
Q.L. laughed at someone when they fell instead of helping them. 
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G.S. cursed in front of children who they were watching. 
U.D. drove under the influence of alcohol. 
A.K. made lots of noise while their roommate was sleeping. 
S.R. stole money from friends while visiting them. 
